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A Matter of 'Governing' Importance": Providing
Business Defamation and Product Disparagement
Defendants Full First Amendment Protection
LISA MAGEE ARENT*
[n my view, "the people need free speech" because they have decided,
in adopting, maintaining and interpreting their Constitution, to govern
themselves rather than to be governed by others. And, in order to make
that self-government a reality rather than an illusion, in order that it
may become as wise and efficient as its responsibilities require, the
judgment-making of the people must be self-educated in the ways of
freedom.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, the centuries-old body of defamation law collided with the first
amendment. 2 This constitutionalization of defamation law, heralded in 1964
as an "'occasion for dancing in the streets,"' 3 is today the subject of an
active reform movement. 4 Although defamation scholars do not agree on
the specific changes, most agree that an overhaul is necessary. 5 Proposals
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1989,
The University of Virginia.
1. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 263
(quoting Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 16). Meiklejohn
argues that the first amendment's role is to protect speech of 'governing' importance." See
id. at 262. This Note argues that under Meiklejohnian theory, criticism of products, businesses,
and business figures should receive full first amendment protection because that speech is of
"'governing' importance." For a discussion of Meiklejohn's theory of the purpose of the first
amendment, see infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
2. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191, 221 n.25 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn's evaluation
of New York Times).
4. Recent proposals for change include the UNIm. DEFAMATION AcT (Nat'l Conf. of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Committee Draft, May 2, 1990) (copy on file with
the Indiana Law Journal), The Model Communicative Torts Act, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1990), and the REPORT OF THE LIm REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON
PROGRAM: PROPOSA FOR THE REFORM OF LIBE LAW (1988).
5. See, e.g., Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 535, 543, (1988).
[Flor those who placed faith in the privileges created by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan and its progeny, today's libel tort must be discouraging, if not utterly
devastating, for it falls substantially short of safeguarding press freedom and
fails to safeguard individual reputation as well.... Change in the libel system
is therefore an imperative.
Id.; see also Halpern, Values and Value: An Essay on Libel Reform, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 227, 251 (1990) ("There is no real disagreement over either the need to remove the
complicating ornamentation from the structure of the law of defamation or the need to provide
fairness to the injured plaintiff and protection for the innocently erroneous defendant.").
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to inject order into the "chaos ' 6 of defamation law include creating a
declaratory judgment of truth for plaintiffs, 7 eliminating presumed damages,8
instituting bifurcated trials and expedited proceedings, 9 and narrowing the
category of defamatory speech which receives first amendment protection.' 0
Despite the vigorous reform movement, the plight of one category of
defamation litigants remains unaddressed by the wave of proposals: defen-
dants sued for defaming" businesses and business figures and for disparaging
products.' 2 This category of speakers has not only been overlooked by the
reformers who seek to inject rationality into defamation law, but in one
instance such speakers have been subject to attack by the producers of the
products which they criticize.' 3 Reform efforts should focus on business
6. Halpern, supra note 5, at 229.
7. See The Model Communicative Torts Act, supra note 4, at 8-11; REPORT OF THE LIBEL
REFoRM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERO WASEINGTON PROGRAM, supra note 4; Franklin, A
Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALM. L. RPv. 809 (1986).
8. See Halpern, supra note 5, at 245 ("[V]irtually all current reform proposals" support
eliminating presumed damages.).
9. UNiw. DEFAMATION ACT, supra note 4, §§ 3-101 to -102.
10. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. PITT. L.
REv. 493 (1990). "The current state of affairs is unacceptable.... A single constitutional
standard is needed to unify the various causes of action that allow the recovery of damages
for the psychic injury caused by speech ...." Id. at 496. Logan proposes limiting first
amendment protection to political speech: "IMhe Court should confer upon political speech
an absolute immunity from any tort action for psychic damages, while committing to the law
of the states the remaining claims." Id. at 574.
11. A defamatory statement "tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule,
or to cause him to be shunned or avoided." PROSSER AND KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS §
111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROss.R & KEETON]. A broader definition identifies a
statement as defamatory if it "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." Id. at 774 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoNiD) OF TORTS § 559 comment e (1977)).
A corporation can recover in defamation for statements which cast aspersions on its "honesty,
credit, efficiency or other business character." Id. at 779 (footnotes omitted). For a comparison
of business reputation and personal reputation, see infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
12. Statements which cast aspersions on a product may also be termed "injurious false-
hood," "commercial disparagement," "slander of goods," or "trade libel." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 963. "The [injurious falsehood) principle has been applied
• . . to statements injurious to the plaintiff's business but casting no reflection upon either
his person or property, such as the assertion that he has died or gone out of business, or
defamatory words concerning his employees." Id. (footnotes omitted).
13. In March, 1991, the Colorado Senate passed a bill that would provide farmers treble
damages for disparagements of their produce. Coates, Colorado Bill Cuts to Core of Produce-
Bashing, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 19, 1991, at 1, col. 5. The bill was passed by the Colorado
House of Representatives in April, 1991. Colorado 'Veggie' Bill Sent to Governor, Chicago
Tribune, Apr. 4, 1991, at 18, col. 1. The bill was introduced in response to the damages apple
farmers suffered when environmentalists held a press conference about the dangers of Alar, a
preservative used on apples. Coates, supra. The Alar danger was later proved to be overstated,
but the losses to the apple industry were reportedly $130-$700 million in 1989. Id.
Ridiculed by consumer groups and the national media, the bill was vetoed by Colorado
Governor Roy Romer on April 29, 1991. Colorado's Anti-Libel 'Veggie Bill' Wilts Under
Governor's Veto, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 30, 1991, at 3, col. 1. "'I am aware of the problems
that unsubstantiated rumors can cause in relation to food products,' Romer said. But,
'constitutional protection gives individuals, as well as consumer groups and researchers the
guaranteed right to raise legitimate questions about food safety and quality."' Id.
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defamation and product disparagement to consider the rationality of the
distinction between the torts and their different recovery requirements. Like
many parts of defamation law, business defamation and product disparage-
ment are in need of a reorganization.14 Such a restructuring must recognize
the value of speech critical of businesses, business figures, and products by
reducing uncertainty for litigants through uniform recovery requirements.
Confusion and inconsistency reign in business defamation and product
disparagement because false statements critical of a business's products and
those critical of its general operations may give rise to separate torts held
to protect distinct interests.' 5 Traditionally, business plaintiffs who attempted
to recover for false allegations about their products faced more difficult
recovery requirements than business plaintiffs who alleged false statements
about their general operations or trade practice.16 The latter received the
benefit of the common law of defamation; the former, the more stringent,
speech-protective requirements of disparagement. Whether the plaintiff is
an individual defamed by statements about activities performed in her
business capacity or a corporation defamed by statements about its opera-
tions, the courts regard the harm as analogous to the harm which occurs
when an individual's personal reputation is defamed about some aspect of
her private life. 17 In contrast, the courts categorize the harm that occurs
when a product is disparaged as an injury to the business's economic
interest.
14. See Johnson, Torts[] Product Disparagement - Defamation, 5 Am. J. Tamx. ADvoc.
415 (1981).
In the context of personal defamation, the courts have made progress toward
resolving the conflict between the protection of the individual's reputation and
the first amendment concern with safeguarding free and open debate. However,
the laws of corporate defamation and product disparagement have not enjoyed
the same judicial attention aimed at the balancing of these competing interests..
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. See, e.g., Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Ohio-Nuclear, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (An action for trade libel only protects a plaintiff's interest in the vendibility
of its products, not in its general reputation.); Allcare, Inc. v. Bork, 176 Ill. App. 3d 993,
531 N.E.2d 1033 (1988) (Defamation lies when a person's integrity in his business or profession
is challenged while commercial disparagement lies when quality of his goods or services is
attacked.), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 557, 541 N.E.2d 1104 (1989).
16. See Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1985),
aff'd, 814 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1987). A product disparagement suit shares a defamation action's
requirements of proof of publication and of the disparaging or defamatory nature of the
statements involved. At common law a disparagement cause of action also contains the
requirement that the plaintiff prove falsity and special damages. Id. To prove special damages,
a plaintiff must show monetary losses caused by the disparaging statement. In contrast,
defamation plaintiffs under the common law are not required to prove falsity and are required
to prove special damages only in certain instances of slander. PROSSER & KETON, supra note
11, §§ 112-13.
17. See, e.g., Finnish Temperance Soc'y Sovittaja v. Publishing Co., 238 Mass. 345, 130
N.E. 845 (1921) (A corporation may have a reputation as valuable as a natural person's which
may be injured by a libel in the same way.).
19921
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Many statements can be classified as either product disparagement or
business defamation. False statements about a business's products reflect
badly on its general image and community standing when consumers identify
the product with the producer. "It might be possible to imply some
accusation of personal inefficiency or incompetence ... in nearly every
imputation directed against a business or its product."18 Courts and com-
mentators acknowledge an area of overlap between business defamation and
product disparagement. 9 Before the constitutionalization of defamation law,
the gray area between the torts may have chilled speech critical of products
because plaintiffs could manipulate some product disparagements into re-
putational injuries to receive the benefit of common law defamation's less
stringent recovery requirements.
The application of the first amendment to defamation law in 1964 reduced
some of the inconsistencies in recovery requirements between the torts. In
some defamation actions, a plaintiff's prima facie case now closely resembles
that of a disparagement plaintiff. 20 Defendants sued for defaming business
plaintiffs are not guaranteed full first amendment protection, however; the
constitutional law of defamation has evolved into a case-by-case balancing
analysis which still presents uncertainty for defendants in business defa-
mation cases. The common law of defamation may apply in some defa-
mation actions, 21 and if the business official or entity is deemed a private
figure and its reputational interest is deemed valuable, then recovery for
business defamation may still be significantly easier than for product dis-
paragement.22
The unpredictability of the Supreme Court's balancing approach and the
uncertainty surrounding a business plaintiff's status as a public figureu
create an atmosphere which discourages speech critical of a business's agents
and operations. Arguably, a similar atmosphere is created for statements
critical of products because such statements may be classified as defama-
tory,u subjecting the statements to lower proof requirements than those of
disparagement.
18. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 965 (footnote omitted).
19. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986);
see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 965 ("The difficulty in the distinction
between the personal aspersion and the commercial disparagement lies in the fact that many
statements effectuate both harms."). Courts have expressly declined to find statements as both
disparaging and defamatory; "yet it is not always easy to find the purported distinction in
the actual facts." Id. (footnote omitted).
20. For an analysis of the evolution of the constitutional law of defamation and a discussion
of its effect on business defamation, see infra notes 50-74 and accompanying text.
21. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality).
For a discussion of Greenmoss, see infra notes 63-68, 125-28 and accompanying text.
22. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749.
23. See id.
24. See United States Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d
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Libel reformers should direct their efforts toward business defamation
and product disparagement because the current atmosphere is likely to deter
valuable criticism of products, businesses, and business figures. An atmos-
phere hostile to the free flow of commercial information hinders effective
resource allocation by denying consumers all available information about
products and businesses.2 Speech about products and businesses is of central
importance in today's society. Consumers make countless spending and
investing decisions in their lives. Speech about products and businesses
should receive full first amendment protection to ensure that these daily
decisions are informed. This heightened protection would create an atmos-
phere which would encourage investigation and exposure of product defects
and unethical business practices.
Defamation law's plaintiff-focused balancing approach has no place in
the law of business disparagement given the strong public need to obtain
information critical of businesses and their products and given the absence
in the business setting of the state's traditional interest in protecting an
individual's dignity and self-esteem. To eliminate the confusion surrounding
the overlap of business defamation and product disparagement, to finally
acknowledge that disparagement and business defamation protect the same
interest, and to encourage the free flow of information about products and
businesses, business defamation should 'be removed from defamation law
and should instead be merged with disparagement. This general category of
business disparagement should then receive the highest level of first amend-
ment protection.
To promote the free flow of criticism of products, businesses, and business
figures, this Note proposes a major overhaul in the way courts approach
tort liability for statements that have been traditionally classified as business
defamation and product disparagement. Part I discusses the historical dis-
tinctions between the torts, their different elements at common law, and
the uncertain effect of the constitutionalization of defamation law on the
Cir.), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 58 (1990). For a discussion of United States Healthcare, see
infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. But see Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d
1033, 1045, 728 P.2d 1177, 1184, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 549 (1986) (stating that defamation
actions are more favorable for plaintiffs than disparagement), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934
(1988).
25. In the arguably analogous area of political decision making, Alexander Meiklejohn has
argued that the first amendment's role is to provide the citizen all information necessary for
governing. Restrictions on information lead to ineffective decision making: "Just so far as, at
any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information
or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good." A. MzuxaoHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATiON TO Smp-GovE 'xENT 26 (1948).
For a discussion of Meiklejohn's first amendment theory and an argument for extending it




business plaintiff's defamation case. Part II considers the logic in eliminating
the distinction between the torts given the identity of the business plaintiff's
interest in avoiding defamatory and disparaging speech, the illogic in anal-
ogizing business and personal reputation, and the high value of the free
flow of commercial information to consumers. Given that statements which
defame a business or business figure's operations should receive the same
treatment, Part III considers the standards of liability and the role of the
litigants in business disparagement.
I. THE GAP BETWEEN THE RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS
OF DISPARAGEMENT AND DEFAMATION
The different treatment of statements critical of a business or business
figure and statements critical of a business's products is related to the values
placed on the actions throughout their historical development. Business
defamation developed under rules designed to protect an individual's interest
in reputation, a value which is entrenched in history.M Persons who were
slandered about their trade or professional performance could recover
without showing pecuniary loss;27 at common law defamation recovery was
relatively simple because reputation was valued so highly.n Corporations
were beneficiaries of the relaxed recovery requirements since they were
deemed persons under the law. As legal persons, the courts invested busi-
nesses with reputations. 29
Product disparagement developed apart from defamation and received
less judicial deference than defamation law because throughout its history
its purpose has been to protect a producer's pecuniary interest in the
salability of its goods,30 an interest which has been valued lower than an
individual's interest in reputation. At common law, disparagement plaintiffs
26. See P. CARTER-RuCK & R. WALKER, CARTER-RuCK ON LIBEL AND SLANDER I (3d ed.
1985) [hereinafter CARTER-RUCK].
27. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 7.05[3] (1990).
28. See Smith, Disparagement of Property (pt. 1), 13 CoLUm. L. Ray. 13, 32 (1913)
("Personal reputation is protected against impairment by language more effectually than
interests in property are protected against impairment by such method.").
29. See Union Associated Press v. Heath, 49 A.D. 247, 63 N.Y.S. 96 (1900). Corporations
were not required to prove special damages in a libel action when the language used was
defamatory in itself and it injuriously and directly affected its credit. Id.; see also Morrison-
Jewell Filtration Co. v. Lingane, 19 R.I. 316, 33 A. 452 (1895) (A private corporation could
maintain a libel action for a publication concerning its trade or occupation in which it is
engaged.).
30. See, e.g., Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 162, 516 A.2d
220, 239 (1986) (Garibaldi, J., concurring) ("A commercial entity's economic interest in the
reputation of its product is not nearly as significant as an individual's interest in its or her
reputation."); see also Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (The
cause of action for product disparagement protects economic interests by providing a remedy
to one who suffers a pecuniary loss from slurs affecting the marketability of his goods.).
[Vol. 67:441
1992] BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
faced standards of proof which were more difficult than those of their
defamation counterparts. Although statements held to be actionable as either
disparagement or defamation are often indistinguishable, commentators have
resisted a merger of the torts on the grounds that defamation protects
"reputation" while disparagement only protects "economic" interests.3'
A. The Differences Between
Product Disparagement and Defamation
In their common law forms, product disparagement and defamation differ
in their requirements for damages, fault, and falsity; in the availability of
injunctive relief; and in the survival of a claim at the plaintiff's death. Both
torts require proof (1) that the words refer to the plaintiff or her goods
(the "of and concerning" requirement), (2) that the statement was com-
municated to a third person, and (3) that the words are of a defamatory
or disparaging nature.12 Compared to defamation, product disparagement
places a higher burden on the plaintiff in the special damages requirement.
In written defamation and certain types of oral defamation at common
law,33 a plaintiff is not required to prove damages because they are presumed.
The special damages element requires the product disparagement plaintiff
to prove actual pecuniary loss flowing from the statement.3 4 To prove this
31. See, e.g., Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defama-
tion, Commercial Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious
Falsehood, 62 TEmp. L. Rv. 903 (1989).
Whereas defamation actions are a means of protecting and vindicating the
reputation of the party about whom a false statement was made, injurious
falsehood actions are designed to afford a remedy to one whose economic interest
was harmed as the result of another's false statement, even though the injured
party's reputation was not necessarily damaged.
Id. at 904 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). "Treating defamation and injurious
falsehood cases alike is a prospect with surface appeal and, indeed, some merit. A complete
merger of the two torts is undesirable, however." Id. at 906.
32. See, e.g., Williams v. Bums, 540 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Colo. 1982) (elements of product
disparagement are falsity, publication, words derogatory to plaintiff's property or its quality,
intent to cause or reasonable likelihood of harm, and special damages); accord Teilhaber Mfg.
Co. v. Unarco Materials Storage, 791 P.2d 1164 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 803 P.2d
517 (Colo. 1991).
The elements of a defamation action at common law were the defamatory nature of the
words, reference to the plaintiff, and publication. CARTER-RucK, supra note 26, at 31.
33. The recovery requirements for slander (oral defamation) vary according to the nature
of the statement. The ordinary slander damages requirement of special damages is relaxed for
statements falling into one of the four categories labelled "slander per se." Statements which
impute criminal activity or loathsome diseases, which affect the plaintiff in her trade or
business, and which impute unchastity are slander per se. Plaintiffs suing for such statements
are not required to prove special damages; for all other slanderous statements, special damages
must be proven. R. SMOLLA, supra note 27, § 7.05.
34. See Angio-Medical Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 720 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
The damage must be a "natural and immediate consequence" of the product disparagement.
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element, plaintiffs often claim that the defendant's statement caused a loss
of product sales or customers. In the past, courts strictly required plaintiffs
to show more than a general decline in business and allowed recovery only
upon proof of lost sales to specific, identified customers.35 The impracti-
cability of identifying lost customers has caused the relaxation of this
identification requirement in some cases. Some courts have approved a
plaintiff's allegation of a general business loss when she demonstrates
sufficient reasons why she cannot specifically identify the lost transactions. 6
The plaintiff must prove that the communication played "a substantial part
in inducing others not to deal with [her]. ''37
In addition to their damage requirements, product disparagement and
defamation differ in their requirements for proof of the defendant's fault.
Under the common law of defamation, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant was at least negligent in publishing the defamatory material;
however, no proof of fault in reference to falsity or the harmful nature of
the statement is required. 8 In its early history, product disparagement was
also a strict liability tort.39 For "injurious falsehood," which includes the
Id. Legal fees and executive time spent attacking the disparagement do not by themselves
constitute special damages. Id.; see also RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs, supra note 11, §
623A comment f. Compensatory damages in product disparagement actions have been "limited
to harm to interests of the plaintiff having pecuniary value." Id. The pecuniary loss proof
requirement is "a stricter rule than the constitutional restriction to 'actual damages' imposed
by the Supreme Court for defamation in Gertz." Id.
For a discussion of the effect of the constitutionalization of defamation law on the damages
requirement, see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
35. PRossER & KEE ON, supra note II, § 128, at 972; see also Angio-Medical, 720 F. Supp.
at 274 (plaintiff's claim falls when it does not plead a loss of customers); Advanced Training
Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1984) (a claim that but for the
disparagement the business would have been more profitable is too speculative to prove special
damages); Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 441, 166 N.E.2d
319, 322, 199 N.Y.S.2d 33, 37 (1960) (persons who ceased to be customers or refused to buy
product must be named to prove special damages).
36. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 972-73. Such a plaintiff can recover
damages when she eliminates other causes of her decline in sales. Teilhaber, 791 P.2d at 1164.
In Teilhaber, the court held that to establish special damages a plaintiff in a product
disparagement action must identify those persons who refused to purchase her product. If that
showing is impossible, the plaintiff may recover by presenting sufficient evidence, using detailed
statistics, to exclude the possibility that factors other than the disparagement caused the loss
of general business. Id.
37. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. 1987) (citing PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 1I, § 128, at 971); see also Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893
F.2d 1488, 1502 (5th Cir. 1990) (Although an intentional disparagement was sufficiently proved,
plaintiff's failure to present evidence of a "nexis [sic] between [the disparagement] and any
loss of business" was fatal to its case.).
38. See. e.g., Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 766 (comparing the elements of defamation with the
"more stringent requirements" of disparagement).
39. See Wood, Disparagement of Title and Quality (pt. 2), 20 CAN. BAR Rav. 430, 431(1942). Wood cites cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which indicate that
wrongful intent was not a necessary element of the disparagement action. Id. Disparagement
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disparagement tort, the Second Restatement of Torts requires fault with
respect to the harmfulness of the statement and its falsity; that is, to prove
fault the plaintiff must show that the defendant published the statement
when she should have recognized that it would cause harm, she did recognize
that it would do so, or she intended to harm the plaintiff's pecuniary
interests. 40 The Restatement also imposes an actual malice standard on the
plaintiff's proof of fault about the falsity of the statement.
The final factor contributing to the product disparagement plaintiff's
heavier burden is the falsity requirement. At common law falsity of the
defamatory statement is presumed; a defendant may prevail on the grounds
of truth only by affirmatively proving the accuracy of the words. In contrast,
under product disparagement "the statement complained of is not prima
facie untrue."141 However, this distinction may have disappeared completely
with the Supreme Court's elimination of the presumption of falsity in most
defamation cases. 42
Despite their heavier evidentiary burden, product disparagement Plaintiffs,
in some cases, possess a tool unavailable to defamation plaintiffs: an
cases reflected confusion over the role of malice because of judicial sloppiness and the fluidity
of the terminology. In disparagement of quality, a plaintiff was only required to prove malice
in response to the defendant's claim of a privilege. Id. at 435.
Prosser and Keeton argue that the imposition of strict liability in product disparagement
"was ... a continuation of the old unsound analogy to personal defamation, when the proper
analogy is rather to cases of interference with contract or to fraud, neither of which involves
any strict liability at all and both of which have narrowly restricted any liability even for
negligence." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 969 (footnotes omitted).
40. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORS, supra note 11, § 623A. The text of section 623A
states the elements for proof of liability for publication of injurious falsehood:
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject
to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of
the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that
it is likely to do so, and
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity.
Id. In Dairy Stores, Judge Garibaldi would have applied the Restatement's actual malice
requirement to product disparagement cases. 104 N.J. at 161, 516 A.2d at 239 (concurring).
Other courts have also applied the standard in such cases. E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1271 (D. Mass. 1981) (actual malice standard
applies in a product disparagement case when the plaintiff is a public figure), rev'd, 692 F.2d
189 (Ist Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). "IThe factors underlying the New York Times
privilege militate perhaps even more strongly in favor of the application of the actual malice
standard in product disparagement cases than they do in personal defamation actions." Id.
41. Wood, supra note 39, at 305 (emphasis in original). According to Wood, the falsity
requirement in title disparagement actions was first established in 1882, and cases as early as
1895 required falsity in a disparagement of quality action. Id. at 306 & n.64.
42. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). For a discussion of




injunction. Although courts have held that defamation cannot be enjoined 4
because of the free speech implications, injunctive relief may be available
in disparagement cases. Before a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against
a disparaging communication, she must prove special damages." Whether
injunctions are proper in product disparagement actions is unsettled. Courts
which have analogized disparagement to unfair competition rather than
defamation have allowed injunctions;45 other courts have applied the defa-
mation rule to prohibit them."
A final distinction between the torts is the survival of the action after
the plaintiff's death. A defamation action does not survive when the plaintiff
dies because recovery after her death is considered a "windfall." 47 In
contrast, a product disparagement action survives because the policy reasons
which require a defamation claim to abate at death do not apply in a
disparagement action."
Since [a disparagement action] involves redress for actual pecuniary
losses rather than simply violations of interest in character or reputation
without measurable loss of economic advantage, redress cannot be
considered a "windfall." [I]f the tort caused pecuniary loss to the
deceased plaintiff, then it caused a similar loss to his estate.49
B. The Effect of the Constitutional Law of Defamation
The constitutionalization of defamation law, which began in 1964 with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,50 has heightened the proof requirements
for most defamation plaintiffs and has thus narrowed the differences
43. The rule against injunctions of defamation is firmly entrenched in the common law.
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). This rule has become firmly entrenched with the
constitutionalization of defamation and the balancing of free speech against reputation.
44. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 971.
45. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMs 453 (1980) (Courts have been
willing to enjoin disparagement in certain cases when they have viewed it as unfair competition.);
see also K. PLEVAN & M. SMOKY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 392 (1988) (If the
defendant's activity constitutes unfair competition, "the speech loses its 'protected' character
and may be enjoined since misleading commercial speech is beyond the protected reach of the
first amendment.").
46. See Fisher & Huard, Note, Injurious Falsehood-An Expanding Tort, 33 GEO. L.J.
213, 223 (1945) (lamenting the analogy of disparagdment to defamation because the focus on
free speech restricts the use of injunctions); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128,
at 928 (The awarding of an injunction depends on whether the court analogizes disparagement
to defamation or to another tort.).
47. Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 51, 329 A.2d 216, 219
(1974). In Menefee, the court held: .'justice does not require a windfall to the plaintiff's heirs
by way of compensation for an injury to him when they have suffered none of their own."'
Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 901 (4th ed. 1971)).
48. Menefee, 458 Pa. at 52, 329 A.2d at 219.
49. Id.
50. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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between disparagement and defamation. In New York Times, the Supreme
Court held that state defamation law is subject to first amendment limits
when the defendant is a public official defamed about the performance of
her official duties. To protect speech that is critical of public officials from
the chilling effects of the common law of defamation, the first amendment
requires proof that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."5  Citing the "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open," ' 52 the Court reasoned that the actual malice standard is necessary
to provide this important kind of speech the "breathing space'"53 it needs.
The Court's cases after New York Times considered the reach of the first
amendment in cases not involving public officials. In Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Buttsm a majority of the Court agreed that the actual malice standard
should apply to criticism of "public figures" as well as to criticism of
public officials. Following Butts, the Court formulated an analysis for
determining the characteristics of a "public figure." In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.,5 a plurality of the Court stated that the public interest
in the event constituting the subject of the defamation is the test for whether
actual malice is required. The plurality followed this approach because a
public issue does not lose its importance merely because private individuals
are involved; defendants who defame private individuals receive constitu-
tional protection if the speech involved is a matter of public concern.5 6
The Rosenbloom approach was short-lived, however. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.57 rejected its issue-focused analysis in favor of a plaintiff-
focused test. In Gertz, the Court weighed the state's interest in protecting
the reputation of private persons and determined that the Rosenbloom
plurality's issue-focused test unduly infringed upon the state's legitimate
interest in protecting reputation. In addition, the public interest test required
judges to perform the difficult task of valuing the subject of the defamation
on a case-by-case basis.58 Striking a balance between the first amendment
and state defamation law, the Court held that
51. Id. at 279-80.
52. Id. at 270.
53. Id. at 271-72.
54. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
55. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality).
56. The plurality said: "We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues,
which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard
to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." Id. at 43-44.
57. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
58. The Rosenbloom test
occasion[ed] the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
[t]hose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the
vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly
classed as public figures ... may recover for injury to reputation only
on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truthA9
In Gertz, the Court extended first amendment protection for defamation
beyond public figure or public official cases; a finding that the plaintiff is
a private figure is not the end of the constitutional analysis. In a break
with the common law, 'the Court held that states can define their own
liability standards for private figure plaintiffs so long as they do not impose
liability without fault.60 In addition, private plaintiffs who show a level of
fault lower than actual malice cannot recover presumed or punitive damages
and are thus limited to recovery for actual damages.6' According to the
Court, such actual damages recoverable without showing aqtual malice could
include impairment of reputation and mental suffering. 62
Although Gertz appeared to replace completely the common law of
defamation, the Court has since reaffirmed the common law standards for
and denied heightened constitutional protection to a category of defamation
actions involving private-person plaintiffs and business defendants. 6 Where
the defamatory speech is of no public concern because it is in the "individual
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," 64 the balance
shifts more strongly in favor of reputation and the common law standards
given the "reduced" first amendment interest. The Court declined to
require a showing of actual malice for a recovery of punitive or presumed
damages" because the concerns which motivated New York Times' protec-
on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public
interest" and which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL, "what information is relevant to self-government." We doubt the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience of judges.
Id. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
59. Gertz, 518 U.S. at 342.
60. Id. at 347. "Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to
intolerable self-censorship." Id. at 340.
61. Id. at 349.
62. Id. at 350 ("Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.
Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include
impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering.").
63. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality).
64. Id. at 762.
65. Id. at 760. "We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection."' Id. at 758 (footnote omitted) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101 (1940), quoted in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978)).
66. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 763.
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tion of defamatory speech do not apply in a narrow business setting. 67 The
Court compared the credit report at issue in Greenmoss to advertising,
which is "hardy" 6s and unlikely to be deterred because it is speech designed
to attract a profit.
Beyond the damages and falsity innovations of Gertz, in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps69 the Court also eliminated the common law
presumption of falsity for defamation cases.70 When the defamation involves
a media defendant and a public official or public figure, or a private
plaintiff and an issue of public concern, proof of falsity is now part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. The falsity requirement is essential, the Court
explained, to ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not
deterred.71
The elimination of strict liability, presumed damages, and the presumption
of falsity has molded defamation into a more speech-protective tort which
is more closely aligned with product disparagement than it was at the height
of the common law. With Greenmoss, however, the Court declined to
overrule completely the cofnmon law and left unprotected an entire category
of business-related speech. Statements that are critical of business figures,
practices, or products are not guaranteed the benefit of the constitutional
safeguards because the level of constitutional protection depends on a case-
by-case analysis focused on the status of the plaintiff and the subject matter
of thie defamation. Greenmoss indicates that this analysis turns on whether
the information is closely related to the consumer's interest. Militating
against first amendment protection is the Court's stated belief that infor-
mation which is not widely circulated and which involves narrow business
concerns is of less constitutional value. The Court has not provided any
guidance regarding which business communications qualify as public con-
cerns or which bisiness figures and businesses qualify as public figures. It
67. Id. at 762. According to the Court, the actual malice standard for recovery of punitive
and presumed damages is unnecessary where
"there is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning
self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-
censorship by the press. The facts of the present case are wholly without the
First Amendment concerns with which the Supreme Court of the United States
has been struggling."
Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366, 568
P.2d 1359, 1363 (1977)).
68. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762.
69. 475 U.S. 767.
70. "We believe that the common law's rule on falsity-that the defendant must bear the
burden of proving truth-must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the
plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages." Id.
at 776.
71. Id. at 777. "'The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order
to protect speech that matters."' Id. at 778 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
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has thus created an atmosphere of uncertainty which may deter speech
critical of products, businesses, and business figures.
Even if all communications about products, businesses, and business
figures were to receive full constitutional protection, compared to product
disparagement, defamation law would still provide a less speech-protective
environment. The availability of presumed damages on a showing of actual
malice and nonpecuniary damages on a showing of some fault may dis-
courage potential defamation defendants from making statements critical of
businesses and business figures. In contrast, disparagement's requirement
of proof of economic loss traceable to the statement is more protective of
criticism than defamation law's damage requirements, since the speaker can
be held liable only for monetary losses which her statement has caused.7
Beyond the continued availability of presumed damages, some speech
falling under the defamation label may also be deterred because the Court
has expressly declined to consider whether constitutional protection is avail-
able to nonmedia defendants. 73 The possibility of less protection for non-
media defamation defendants creates uncertainty for a large group of
potential critics of businesses. In contrast, most courts require the dispar-
agement plaintiff to prove the same elements whether the defendant is a
member of the media or not.74
While the constitutionalization of defamation law narrowed the eviden-
tiary gap between product disparagement and business defamation, the
Supreme Court's balancing analysis perpetuates uncertainty for defendants;
a potential critic cannot predict the protection she will receive. The different
recovery requirements between the torts and the factual similarity between
situations giving rise to actions for business defamation and product dis-
paragement create an atmosphere which also encourages plaintiff manipu-
72. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 623A comment f. Compensatory
damages in disparagement actions have been "limited to harm to interests of the plaintiff
having pecuniary value." Id. The pecuniary loss proof requirement is "a stricter rule than the
constitutional restriction to 'actual damages' imposed by the Supreme Court in Gertz." Id;
see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 128, at 965 n.36 (Supp. 1988) ("Since, in theory,
a corporation may have an action for defamation as well as disparagement, the defamation
action may succeed, with, perhaps, presumed damages, even" though the disparagement action
fails." (citation omitted)).
73. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to consider whether nonmedia defendants
should receive the same first amendment protections that media defendants currently possess.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 n.6 (1990); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779
n.4.
74. See Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 152-54, 516 A.2d at 234-35. In Dairy Stores, the court
held that the New York Times actual malice standard is available to both media and nonmedia
defendants. Therefore, the source of a derogatory newspaper article about the plaintiff's
product was entitled to the same protection from liability for defamation provided by the




lation. Simply by labelling its claim as defamation, a business plaintiff can
increase its chances of recovery for a critical statement.
C. Judicial Treatment of Defamation and Product Disparagement
The atmosphere of uncertainty for potential business critics is intensified
because judges are faced with the difficult task of sifting through often
identical fact situations to label statements as either defamatory or dispar-
aging. Because of the murky factual distinction between the torts and the
seemingly arbitrary line drawing, potential critics cannot determine in ad-
vance whether their speech will receive the protection of product disparage-
ment or defamation law's nebulous balancing analysis.
Recognizing that product disparagement and defamation can both encom-
pass statements critical of products, businesses, and business figures, courts
acknowledge an area of overlap between the torts, 5 even though they
continue to maintain the separation between disparagement and defama-
tion.76 Statements disparaging a manufacturer's product which also suggest
that the manufacturer was dishonest, lacked integrity, or knowingly de-
frauded the public are actionable as defamation as well.77
Courts have doubtless invested time and rhetoric in their struggle to
conform the facts of each case to one or the other category.78 Often
disparagements reflect badly on the business's judgment. Similarly, in many
cases, statements which are held to be defamatory reflect badly on the
plaintiff's products. As a result, a court's reasons for placing statements
into one or the other category are usually unsatisfactory from a policy
perspective.
75. See Modem Products, Inc. v. Schwartz, 734 F. Supp. 362, 363 (E.D. Wis. 1990);
Angio-Medical, 720 F. Supp. at 274; Allcare Inc. v. Bork, 176 Ill. App. 3d 993, 1000, 531
N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (1988); Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 133, 516 A.2d at 224.
76. PROSSER & KIroN, supra note 11, § 129, at 965 ("The courts have gone to some
lengths ... in refusing [to find defamation in imputations against a business or its products],
particularly where the most that can be made out of the words is a charge of ignorance or
negligence." (footnotes omitted)).
77. REsTAmTMENr (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 623A comment g. The plaintiff can
allege both causes of action in the same lawsuit and, "so long as the damages are not
duplicated," may recover damages under both theories. Id.; see also Wham, Disparagement
of Property, 21 U. ILL. L. REv. 26, 27 (1926).
The standard is generally stated: "[A] statement is mere disparagement of property and not
defamation of the owner or manufacturer where it does not impute dishonesty, fraud, lack of
integrity or reprehensible conduct to such owner or manufacturer in connection with the
property, goods or product referred to in the objectionable language, but constitutes defamation
when it ascribes such conduct to an owner." Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement?, 24
Mimq. L. Ray. 625, 631 (1940).
78. See Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,
74 CAL. L. REv. 691, 699 (1986). "In many cases, particularly where the plaintiff is a
corporation, it is difficult to distinguish between defamation and injurious falsehood, since it
is not possible to separate defamation of the plaintiff from disparagement of plaintiff's
property or business." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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The cases in which the courts apply the reputation-product distinction
provide the strongest support for merging business defamation into dispar-
agement. United States Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia9
is an example of a judicial attempt to draw the line between the torts. The
case involved advertisements published as part of a reciprocal advertising
war between a health maintenance organization (HMO) and Blue Cross/
Blue Shield. The court held that some of the advertisements contained
actionable product disparagement and that others were only actionable as
defamation. One advertisement showed a grief-stricken woman who said:
"The hospital my HMO sent me to just wasn't enough." 0 The ad's words
and visual presentation suggested that the woman suffered some terrible
tragedy because of the "HMO's substandard care." 8 1 The court held that
the ad did not constitute product disparagement although the ad clearly
implied that the HMO's services were lacking. Instead, the ad's criticism
went "beyond the product itself to impute reprehensible conduct to the
corporation.' '82
The United States Healthcare court provided little guidance as to what
characteristics make an advertisement so harmful that it is defamation rather
than product disparagement; beyond a few references to scare tactics, it
provided no sound policy basis for distingfishing between defamation and
disparagement. The alternative grounds of defamation and product dispar-
agement provide a court with tools of manipulation to punish communi-
cation which it views as having little value.8 3 The court can punish extremely
unattractive disparagements with the defamation label. Likewise, it can
punish unattractive plaintiffs by categorizing the harmful statements as
product disparagements.
The courts are, however, usually not to blame for the irrational line
drawing between product disparagement and defamation; they are often
mere pawns of plaintiff manipulation. With the constitutionalization of
defamation law, business plaintiffs may have looked to avoid the first
amendment's heightened requirements by pursuing alternative grounds of
recovery. "In recent years plaintiffs suing press defendants have more
frequently affixed labels other than defamation to injurious falsehood claims
79. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
80. Id. at 926.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 927. The court explained that there was no actionable product disparagement
claim "because the statements are directed at the vendor, not his goods." Id. The court's
reasoning is illogical, since the damages would reach the seller through the charge that its
product was ineffective.
83. The Third Circuit in United States Healthcare clearly disapproved of the two ads that
it held were defamatory. The court referred to the ads' "scare tactics" several times and
appeared to be motivated by the defendants' intentional use of the unsavory marketing
technique. See id. at 927. Arguably, with this evaluation, the court injected an element of
consumer protection into corporate defamation law.
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and have increasingly achieved some measure of success in their actions."' '
II. CLOSING THE GAP: PROVIDING DISPARAGEMENT DEFENDANTS
FULL FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
To eliminate the need for line drawing and thus to create for potential
critics of products, businesses, and business figures an atmosphere of
certainty which would foster free speech, business defamation and product
disparagement should be treated as the same tort.8" The courts should
remove business defamation from defamation law because the current
analogy between personal and business reputation has no factual or policy
basis; rather, business defamation and product disparagement protect anal-
ogous economic interests in profits and in product marketability. Under
this new tort, defendants should receive full first amendment protection in
recognition of the high value of speech critical of products, business figures,
and business operations.
In applying uniform recovery requirements for defamation of business
and personal reputation, courts have treated the two harms as though they
cause similar injuries. Actually, the psychic injury associated with defama-
tion of personal reputation offends different interests than the economic
injury arising in business defamation. The reasons for which the Supreme
Court values the state's interest in protecting personal reputation over the
first amendment interest in the criticism do not apply to business reputation
because the latter is not as vulnerable and in need of state protection as
the former.8 6 Statements critical of business reputation do not merit the
same state interest as statements critical of personal reputation because a
business has no dignity or feelings to be injured.
Since the economic interests protected by business defamation are more
properly analogized to the interests protected by product disparagement,
84. Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1045, 728 P.2d 1177, 1184, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 542, 549 (1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988) (citation omitted). This observation
is cited as support for the application of the first amendment's heightened liability standards
for defamation to other communicative torts. "It follows that to prevent creative pleading
from rendering the limitations nugatory, they must be broadly applicable whenever the
gravamen of the claim is injurious falsehood." Id. at 1042, 728 P.2d at 1184, 232 Cal. Rptr.
at 549.
For an argument that defamation law's current balancing approach actually creates a hostile
atmosphere for defendants who criticize products, businesses, or business figures, see supra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
85. Throughout the remainder of this Note, the tort which is created from this merger will
be called "business disparagement."
86. In Gertz, the Supreme Court declined to apply full first amendment protection to a
statement critical of a private figure because the state has a strong interest in protecting the
"vulnerable" reputation of private persons. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343
(1974). For a discussion of Gertz's analysis of the state's interest in protecting private reputation,
see infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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the courts should merge defamation of businesses and business figures into
product disparagement. Given the weaker state interest in protecting against
such economic harms, the courts should then afford business disparagement
defendants full first amendment protection. This standard of liability would
encourage the free flow of speech critical of businesses, business figures,
and products. The fullest amount of such speech is necessary for consumers
to make decisions about the most efficient allocation of their resources.
Because consumers influence change in business and society through pur-
chase and investment decisions, the courts should deem information about
products, businesses, and business figures as a matter of .'governing'
importance.' '
A. The Different Interests Implied
by Business and Personal Reputation
Because personal and business defamation are included within the bound-
aries of defamation, the "reputation" which the tort protects is composed
of two different sorts of interests. A business's interest in its reputation is
economic,"8 while an individual's interest in her personal reputation involves
deeper feelings of self-esteem and dignity. The state's interest in protecting
a business or product from false criticism is not as compelling as its interest
in protecting personal reputation against false charges because business
reputation is not as vulnerable as personal reputation. As a result, the
Supreme Court's reasons for deferring to the state's interest in protecting
personal reputation do not apply when the speech involves injury to business
reputation.
p
87. Meiklejohn, supra note 1, at 262. According to Meiklejohn, the first amendment
protects all information necessary for self-government. In his view, this protection extends
beyond political speech to the arts and literature. "[Tihe people do need novels and dramas
and paintings and poems, 'because they will be called upon to vote.' The primary social fact
which blocks and hinders the success of our experiment in self-government is that our citizens
are not educated for self-government." Id. at 263 (quoting Kalven, supra note 1, at 16).
Under Meiklejohn's first amendment theory, speech about products, businesses, and busifiess
figures is not of "governing importance." For a discussion of Meiklejohn's theory and an
argument for an extension of it to speech about products, businesses, and business figures,
see infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
88. The argument that reputation is purely economic does not explain a business figure's
interest in her business reputation. A person's identity is likely to be closely tied to her job.
Although this Note argues that all statements critical of products, businesses, and business
figures should be removed from defamation law and should receive the highest level of
constitutional protection, the inclusion of criticism of business figures cannot turn on the
business-reputation-as-economic-interest argument. Instead, statements critical of business fig-
ures' performance of their duties should be protected because of the importance of such
criticism in consumer decision making. For a discussion of the value of this criticism and the
justification for providing it the highest level of constitutional protection, see infra notes 110-
37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the disparagement proof requirements as applied
to plaintiffs who are business figures, see infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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In many instances of business defamation the plaintiff is a corporation
or other business entity. In granting corporations many of the same rights
as natural persons, courts have included among those rights the ability to
sue for defamation. Corporations have thus become beneficiaries of the
easy recovery system developed to protect personal reputation. Although
corporations have received the same reputational protection as individuals,
the courts have never held that a business can feel pain or loss of dignity
from defamatory statements. False statements critical of a business or its
products inflict injuries only to the business's economic well-being. Because
defamation of business entities and of natural persons harm fundamentally
different interests, courts encounter difficulty when forced to compare the
two wrongs under a tort designed to protect personal reputation. Some have
held that a corporation has no personal reputation; 9 others have described
corporate reputation as distinct from individual reputation. 9°
Particularly revealing of the purely economic nature of a business's
reputation is Electrical Board of Trade of New York v. Sheehan.9' In
Sheehan, the New York Appellate Division held that a membership corpo-
ration which could not engage in business under New York corporation law
could not maintain an action for slander since it had no credit to be affected
and it could not suffer pecuniary loss.Y The holding suggests that personal
and business reputation are distinct93 and that the latter interest is concerned
89. Golden Palace, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (A corporation may maintain an action for libel,
but it has no personal reputation and may be libeled only by an imputation about its financial
soundness or business ethics.).
90. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928 of United Steelworkers of
Am., 152 F.2d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 1945) (Although a distinction exists between individual and
corporate personality, a corporation has a business reputation protected by law.); see also
Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F.2d 255, 257 (8th Cir. 1926)
(Only in its credit, property, or business can a corporation be injured by falsity; it has no
reputation like an individual's.); Novick v. Hearst Corp., 278 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Md.
1968) ("[A] corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual has[;] it is only with
respect to its credit, property or business that a corporation can be injured by a false
publication."); Interstate Optical Co. v. Illinois State Soc'y of Optometrists, 244 Ill. App.
158, 162 (1927) (A corporation has a business reputation which can be libeled.).
91. 210 N.Y.S. 127 (A.D. 1925).
92. Id. at 127. Under New York corporate law, the Electrical Board of Trade, as a
membership corporation, was not permitted to engage in any business for a pecuniary profit.
Id. Although the corporation's complaint did not allege special damages arising from the
slander, it could still recover if the slander directly affected its credit or caused it pecuniary
loss. Id. at 128. Since the Electrical Board of Trade did not engage in business for a pecuniary
profit, it therefore could not recover for slander since it had no credit nor pecuniary interest
which could have been harmed. Id.
93. But some cases describe injury to corporate reputation as exactly like injury to personal
reputation. See, e.g., Hornell Broadcasting Corp. v. A.C. Nielson Co., 8 A.D.2d 60, 63, 185
N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (1959) (A corporation may maintain an action for libel where a statement
alleges mismanagement or bad credit or subjects it to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace.), aff'd,
8 N.Y.2d 767, 168 N.E.2d 115, 201 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1960).
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with economic well-being. Actionable injuries to corporate reputation include
allegations of insolvency,9 bad credit,95 and unethical business practices.9
A corporation's reputation is protected against these types of charges to
protect its continued transaction of business.Y
In contrast, personal reputation is protected for nonpecuniary reasons.
The protection of an individual's good name is firmly grounded in the
history of defamation law.98 In Gertz,9 the Supreme Court reiterated its
recognition of the high value of personal reputation:
[The individual's right to the protection of his own good name "reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection
of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled
to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional
system."100
According to the Court, when the plaintiff is a public figure the strong
public interest in the speech outweighs the state's interest in protecting
reputation; in comparison, when the plaintiff is a private figure the weaker
public interest in the speech will not necessarily outweigh the state's interest
in protecting reputation. In Gertz, the Court explained that the heightened
speech-protective standard of New York Times was grounded in the strong
94. Golden Palace, 386 F. Supp. 107.
95. Novick, 278 F. Supp. 277.
96. Coronado Credit Union v. Koat Television, Inc., 99 N.M. 233, 656 P.2d 896 (Ct. App.
1982).
97. See Samson United Corp. v. Dover Mfg. Co., 233 A.D. 155, 156, 251 N.Y.S. 466,
468 (A corporation has an action for libel when the statement affects its public image or its
credit, or when the statement drives away its customers.), rev'g 139 Misc. 312, 248 N.Y.S.
325 (1931).
98. See CARTER-RucK, supra note 26, at 1 ("There is no doubt that the high value placed
upon good reputation has persisted through the ages .....
99. 418 U.S. 323.
100. Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
"The rhetorical power of the [preceding] passage is undeniable. It has proved enormously
influential, and can fairly be characterized as an authentic contemporary expression of common
law understanding of the law of defamation." Post, supra note 78, at 707-08 (footnote
omitted).
The Court has even held implicitly that injury to reputation is not a threshold requirement
for a successful defamation claim. An action for defamation is sustainable so long as some
psychic injury is alleged. In holding that a defamation plaintiff need not allege injury to
reputation, the Court alluded to a previous opinion which held that:
States [can] base awards on elements other than injury to reputation[;] ...
"personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering" [are] examples of
injuries which might be compensated consistently with the Constitution upon a
showing of fault. Because respondent has decided to forgo recovery for injury
to her reputation, she is not prevented from obtaining compensation for such
other damages that a defamatory falsehood may have caused her.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 530).
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first amendment interest given the weaker state interest in protecting the
reputation of public officials.10' The Court in Gertz imposed a less stringent
rule of recovery for' private figure plaintiffs because private reputation is
more vulnerable and deserving of protection than a public figure's reputa-
tion.cc
The reasons for protecting a private plaintiff's reputation do not apply
to businesses or business figures as plaintiffs. Interest in business reputation
is an "interest not nearly as significant as an individual's interest in his
personal reputation and hardly 'at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty."' 03 Protecting business reputation is a less compelling goal than
protecting personal reputation because a corporation "has no personality,
no dignity that can be assailed, no feelings that can be touched. Since it
cannot suffer physical pain, worry or distress, it cannot lie awake nights
brooding about a defamatory article."" 4 Rather, a corporation's reputation
is merely "a basis for inducing others to engage in market or nonmarket
transactions with [it]."1' -° Some courts have agreed that a business's repu-
tation presents less compelling concerns and is thus less deserving of
protection than an individual's reputation.'0
Even if business reputation were regarded as analogous to personal
reputation, more stringent recovery requirements should be applied to
business defamation plaintiffs because injury to business reputation is easier
101. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43. "[W]e believe that the New York Times rule states an
accommodation between this concern and the limited state interest present in the context of
libel actions brought by public persons." Id. at 343.
102. Id. at 344 ("Private individuals are.. . more vulnerable to injury [than public figures],
and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater."). "[W]e conclude that
the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that
a different rule should obtain with respect to them." Id. at 343.
103. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270 (D.
Mass. 1981) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)),
rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
104. R. Pii~ps & E. HAmsnToN, LIBEL 80 (1966).
105. R. PosNER, EcONoiac ANALYSIS OF LAW 196 (3d ed. 1986). Posner's definition is not
confined to a business's reputation. Arguably, the difference between personal and business
reputation from an economic perspective is that injuries to dignity and psychic well-being are
intangible harms which are difficult to quantify. In contrast, because they often result in lost
business opportunities and lost customers, injuries to business reputation are more easily
quantified. See also Lachman, Reputation and Risktaking, in THE CosT OF LIBEL[:] ECONOMC
AND PouCY IMPLICATIONS 2313 (E. Dennis & E. Noam eds. 1989) (Reputation "is something
of an enduring nature ... and therefore a kind of capital asset.").
106. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 162, 516 A.2d 220,
239 (1986) (Garibaldi, J., concurring) ("A commercial entity's economic interest in the
reputation of its product is not nearly as significant as an individual's interest in his or her
reputation." (citation omitted)). Judge Garibaldi argues that a business's less compelling
reputational interests justify imposing a higher fault requirement for recovery of damages. See
also Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment 'Public Figure' Nailing
the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. REv. 35 (1982). "[I]njury to corporate reputation is less problematic
for society than injury to personal reputation." Id. at 37.
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to quantify than the intangible injuries resulting from defamation of personal
reputation. The social nature of injury to personal reputation presents
difficult quantification problems. 107 In contrast, injuries to business repu-
tation are easier to translate into dollars and cents because they usually
result in lost business opportunities, profits, and customers. The nature of
business defamation does not justify the low damage requirements of
personal defamation. 08
All defamatory statements do not fall squarely into either the business or
personal reputation categories, however. Statements critical of an indivi-
dual's performance of her job could conceivably fall into both categories.
Such defamation could harm an individual's dignity as well as her business
standing. Just as the state protects an individual against false statements
about her private life, the state has an interest in protecting her against
false statements about her business life. Yet business figure plaintiffs suing
for false statements about job performance do not need the benefit of
presumed damages; such plaintiffs usually can recover damages by proving
loss of opportunity, employment, or salary. Although a business figure's
interest in her business reputation is important and deserves protection, the
value of speech critical of business figures is of central importance to
consumer decision making because business figures of all levels exert a great
deal of influence over a consumer's life.109 The state's interest in protecting
107. The rationale of the common law rules has been the experience and judgment of history
that "proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the
character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain
that serious harm has resulted in fact." W. PROSSER, supra note 47, § 112.
108. Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff 69 CoLiuM. L. REy. 1496, 1510 (1969).
While jury discretion [in calculating damages] may be justified where the plaintiff
is a natural person, this discretion should not be permitted where the plaintiff is
a corporate entity. A corporation has no soul. Its feelings are never wounded.
If it has been injured, the injury must be an economic loss which must in turn
be reflected in the corporate balance sheet.
Id. Because damages are easier to prove for defamation of business entities, the commentator
argues for the elimination of presumed damages in corporate libel cases. Id.
Some commentators advocate stiffening the defamation damage requirements in all cases.
Most suggested defamation reform proposals advocate eliminating presumed damages. See
Halpern, supra note 5, at 245.
109. Chief Justice Warren recognized the blurring of lines between public and business
officials:
While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of governmental
power, power has also become much more organized in what we have commonly
considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy determinations
which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now
originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees,
commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with
the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the
case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment
are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions
[Vol. 67:441
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reputation is thus outweighed by the importance of the criticism. Although
business figure plaintiffs may still seek recovery under business disparage-
ment, the courts should heighten the recovery requirements to protect the
speech.
B. The High Value of Speech Critical of Products,
Businesses, and Business Figures
Courts should provide full first amendment protection to business dis-
paragement defendants because speech critical of businesses and products
is so valuable to society. With today's marketplace 'confronting consumers
with an overabundance of different types and brands of products, individuals
are faced with countless purchase decisions throughout their lives. For
informed spending decisions, speech critical of products, businesses, and
business figures plays an important role. Few decisions are more dominant
in a person's life than what products to buy or in which company to
invest. 10 Because information about products and the operations of their
manufacturers is so crucial for an average American's day-to-day decision
making, defendants sued for defamation of products, businesses, and busi-
ness figures should receive the highest level of constitutional protection of
New York Times. Full first amendment protection through application of
the actual malice standard would thus create an atmosphere which encour-
ages persons to investigate and discover defects and to announce criticism
of products, businesses, and business figures; the criticism would in turn
improve consumer decision making and encourage businesses to avoid future
criticism by improving their products and remedying defects.
Under the constitutional law of defamation, speech critical of public
officials and public figures is protected because it is central to the purposes
of the first amendment. Speech critical of businesses, business figures, and
products is similarly related to the first amendment's purposes. The citizenry
or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, J., concurring).
Of course, not all business figures exert control over consumers' lives. TiD impose a case-
by-case analysis in which greater constitutional protection would be awarded to defendants
who defame high-level executives would be to make judgments about which speech is most
valuable for consumer decision making. Such an analysis would likely deter potential critics
of unethical or inefficient low-level corporate policies. "Uncertainty as to the scope of the
constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech-the more elusive the standard,
the less protection it affords." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 686 (1989).
For a discussion of which defendants should receive the highest level of constitutional
protection under business disparagement, see infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
110. Americans' personal consumption expenditures, totaling $3.2 billion, made up 66% of
the gross national product in 1988. BURAu oF THE CENSUS, U.S. Dmr. oF COMmeRCE,
STATTICAL ABsTRAcT OF THnE UNrrED STATES 1990, at 425 (Table No. 690). This percentage
remained constant from 1983 to 1988. In comparison, in 1988 Americans spent 15% of the
gross national product on private domestic investments. Id.
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can exert tremendous power over national policy by buying or refusing to
buy the products of certain manufacturers."' In modem society the citizen's
power to purchase is a vehicle for voicing her opinions on issues of public
concern." 2 Product boycotts have become commonplace in American life,"'
"largely because they are so successful. ' 1 4
This power in the marketplace is akin to the power as self-governor
Alexander Meiklejohn envisioned for American citizens. According to Mei-
klejohn, the central purpose of the first amendment is to assist citizens in
obtaining information necessary to fulfill their roles as governors in the
democracy." 5 The Supreme Court apparently adopted Meiklejohn's vision
of the central role of the first amendment"16 with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan's"7 guarantee of actual malice protection to those who criticize
public officials" 8 and Butts's extension of that protection to criticism of
public figures." 9 The first amendment "'was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people." ' 120 Meiklejohn argued that the freedom of speech
I11. See Smith, Consumer Boycotts and Consumer Sovereignty, 21 EuR. J. MARKETi'ro 7
(1987). "The consumer boycott is, as a moral act, an expression by the individual of his or
her preferences on the issue, a sanction by the individual as the state is not prepared to act.
It also adds to the aggregate of pressure for change." Id. at 13.
112. Id.
In consumer boycotts, consumers are ... employing their purchase votes to
express a difference of interest to producers. They are voting against business
practices of which they disapprove by not buying a firm's product. In other
words, they are exercising consumer sovereignty to express concern about and
perhaps change undesirable activities by producers.
Id. at 12. For example, citizens anxious to destroy apartheid in South Africa have protested
against and boycotted American corporations which have investments there. Boycotting Cor-
porate America, ECONOmiST, May 26, 1990, at 69.
113. Boycotting Corporate America, supra note 112, at 69. In 1990, consumers exercised
their purchasing power to stop canners from selling tuna caught in nets prone to trap and kill
dolphins, to pressure a cosmetic company to cease testing products on animals, and to protest
a large oil company's investments in South Africa. Id. Also, animal rights groups who protested
the use of animal fur for coats exerted pressure on fellow consumers, leading to a drop in
fur company profits. Id. at 70.
114. Id. at 69.
115. Meiklejohn, supra note 1, at 253-54.
116. Kalven, supra note 3, at 209 ("[Tihe [New York Times] opinion almost literally
incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in a democracy the citizen as ruler is our
most important public official." (citation omitted)).
117. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
118. "It is as much [the citizen's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer."
Id. at 282 (citation omitted). Free speech is essential 'to maintain the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means."' Id. at 301 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
119. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).




guaranteed by the first amendment is crucial to a citizen's role in self-
government.
Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of
information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged by our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a deeper
sense, govern them. Over our governing, they have no power. Over their
governing we have sovereign power. 2'
The first amendment's purpose is to provide citizens all the information
necessary to "understand the issues which bear upon our common life.
That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no
relevant information, may be kept from them." 12 Purchasing decisions
dominate many citizens' lives. With countless choices available, the free
flow of commercial information is vital for the best allocation of consumer
resources.'12 Concerning "the question of freedom of information in the
121. Meiklejohn, supra note 1, at 257. Although he included art and literature as issues of
governing concern deserving an uninhibited flow, Meiklejohn excluded the role of a "merchant
advertising his wares" because it is "utterly different from that of a citizen who is planning
for the general welfare." A. MNmixmom, supra note 25, at 39.
Meiklejohn, writing in 1948, may not have envisioned the role of consumption in modem
society. In some instances the power to purchase is an effective tool to effect change. For
example, without the vocalization of public concern for the environment, it is doubtful that
manufacturers would have been motivated to produce environmentally safe, less wasteful
products and packaging. See Marketing Greenery[-] Friendly to Whom?, EcoNomisT, Apr. 7,
1990, at 83; see also M. REDisH, FREEDoM OF ExPPsssoN: A CarcAL ANALYsis (1984).
[The appropriate scope of the first amendment protection is much broader than
... Meiklejohn would have it. Free speech aids all life-affecting decision making,
no matter how personally limited, in much the same manner in which it rids the
political process. Just as individuals need an open flow of information and
opinion to aid them in making their electoral and governmental decisions, they
similarly need a free flow of information and opinion to guide them in making
other life-affecting decisions.
Id. at 22; see also Gerety, The Submarine, The Handbill, and The First Amendment, 56 U.
CiN. L. Rav. 1167, 1169 (1988) ("A persuasive argument can also be made for the importance-
even the political importance-of commercial information.") (emphasis in original). But see
C. BxE, HUmAN LmaRTY AND FREEzoM OF SPEEcH (1989). Baker argues that "profit-
motivated commercial speech should be denied [constitutional] protection .... It lacks the
crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization that are central to justifications
for the constitutional protection of speech, justifications that in turn define the proper scope
of protection under the first amendment." Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).
122. A. MlEnyioHN, supra note 25, at 88-89.
123. Meiklejohn's argument that the citizens themselves must judge the wisdom of speech
applies in the context of commercial information. "Just so far as, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or
disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered,
ill-balanced planning for the general good." Id. at 26.
The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of consumer information:
So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
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market place," "a free society cannot look to government as a protector
of freedom of information for its own people.'"' Informed consumption
can promote efficient decision making and can help preserve natural re-
sources.
The Supreme Court in Greenmoss rejected implicitly the view that speech
about businesses is a matter essential to self-government in holding that a
credit report need not receive protection because the free flow of such
information is not central to the first amendment. The concerns of New
York Times are not present, the Court held, when the speech is of a narrow
business interest and, like advertising, is hardy and unlikely to be deterred.
The Court concluded that with less protection for a credit report "'[t]here
is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-
censorship by the press." ' " 21 The Court noted that the states are free to
provide credit report publishers with a privilege shielding them from lia-
bility. 12
The Court's denial of first amendment protection for the credit report
turned on the state's interest in protecting reputation through defamation
law and the narrowly commercial nature of the communication. Greenmoss
did not recognize, however, the fundamental policy distinction between
personal and business reputation' 27 and the diminished need for state pro-
tection of the latter. In the credit report situation, proving injury to business
reputation is not inherently difficult; thus, the state does not have a
information is indispensable.... And if it is indispensable to the proper allo-
cation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976) (footnotes omitted); accord Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
124. May, Government Protection and Consumer Rights, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN
THE MARKET PLACE 63 (1967).
125. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (plurality)
(quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366, 568 P.2d 1359,
1363 (1977)).
126. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 763 n.9. Most states do apply a privilege to credit reports. Id.
127. See Post, supra note 78, at 740. According to Post, the problem with Greenmoss is
the identification of the issue as a fundamental conflict between free speech and "reputation."
This formulation
is deeply misleading. Reputation is not a single idea, but is instead a melange of
several different concepts. Each concept demands its own constitutional analysis
.... For example, although Justice Powell justifies defamation law in terms of
the protection of human dignity, the plaintiff in [Greenmoss] was a corporation
that could advance no conceivable claim to such dignity.
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compelling interest which sufficiently counterbalances the first amendment
interest in the free flow of information.
The "hardiness" of commercial information such as credit reports and
advertising was another factor on which the Court based its decision to
deny the credit report first amendment protection in Greenmoss. While
advertising of one's own products is absolutely vital for business existence,
criticism of a competitor's product may not be: Thus, lower protection for
speech about businesses, business figures, and products could deter such
marginally vital but socially valuable criticism. Courts should deem such
statements as issues of governing importance under the first amendment
because information about a business's policies and products aids a con-
sumer's purchase decisions.' 8 Through this protection, individual manufac-
turers would remain free to formulate their own cost-benefit analyses of
the efficacy of negative advertising. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,2 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found first amendment
value in a caricature of a minister which appeared in Hustler magazine:
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the funda-
mental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of
public interest and concern. "IThe freedom to speak one's mind is not
only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but
also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society
as a whole.'"
Analogously,
just as our system of government is based on faith in the individual
citizen's ability to determine matters for himself, so does the success of
our free economy rest on the ability of the consumer to choose intelli-
gently in the market place-based on a free flow of information in a
free, unregimented economy. 3'
In addition to the explicit guarantee of the freedom of speech, the Supreme
Court has recognized the implicit first amendment guarantee of the freedom
to receive information. 13 2 The Court has acknowledged the strong interest
in the free flow of information about products.' A restraint on the free
128. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Greenmoss, described speech about business matters as
"an important part of our public discourse," 472 U.S. at 787, even if it does not directly
implicate 'the central meaning of the First Amendment."' Id. (quoting New York Times,
376 U.S. at 273).
129. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
130. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-
04 (1984)).
131. May, supra note 124, at 65.
132. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (The freedom of speech "afforded
is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."); see also Dairy Stores, 104
N.J. at 162, 516 A.2d at 239 (Garibaldi, J., concurring) ("mhe public has a substantial
interest in gaining information about the quality and character of products.").
133. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's
interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate.").
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flow of product information hurts those who need inexpensive information
the most; 134 only those citizens with the financial ability may spend extra
resources to obtain the information.
Some courts have suggested that information about products presents a
more compelling argument for first amendment protection than statements
about personal reputation.' 35 "Information obtained from product commen-
tators often relates to health or safety problems in consumer products. It
would be unfortunate indeed if the threat of product disparagement actions
stifled the free flow of such information."'13 6 Courts have granted first
amendment protection to information about products because the infor-
mation's significance outweighs the manufacturer's interest in its business
reputation, "an interest not nearly as significant as an individual's interest
in his personal reputation and hardly 'at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty." "' 37
C. Doctrines Opposing Full First Amendment Protection
Some commentators have argued that the commercial speech doctrine
prevents disparagements from receiving full first amendment protection
because they often arise from advertisements.' Greenmoss cited the com-
mercial nature of a credit report as a factor weighing against providing it
first amendment protection; such commercial speech was said to be "hardy"
because the profit motive eliminates the chilling effect of regulation.3 9 Other
134. Id. The Court noted that information about prescription drugs is particularly important
to consumers. The lack of information caused by a state regulation against advertising hit the
elderly, the sick, and the poor the hardest.
135. Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. at 163, 516 A.2d at 239 (Garibaldi, J., concurring) (quoting
with approval Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1271). In Bose, the district court argued that disparaging
statements are strong candidates for the actual malice protection: "The public's interest in
obtaining information of this type is perhaps even greater than the corresponding interest in
personal defamation actions, the interest in obtaining information about other people." 508
F. Supp. at 1271.
136. Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1271 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1270 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
138. See Langvardt, supra note 31, at 938. Another commentator argued that the commercial
speech analysis provides a "rational and compelling dividing line within the tort of disparage-
ment. Speech ... characterized as commercial lacks the attributes that constitutional privilege
seeks to protect .. . ." Reinhard, Note, The Tort of Disparagement and the Developing First
Amendment, 1987 Duicn L.J. 727, 758.
See also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. Ri-v. 1, 6 (1979) ("Although disallowing state interference with
commercial advertising serves [the] values... [of] aggregate economic efficiency and consumer
opportunity to maximize utility in a free market-these values are not appropriate for judicial
vindication under the first amendment."); Shauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture
of the First Amendment, 56 U. C'm. L. REv. 1181, 1182 (1988) ("[T]here is widespread
(although certainly not unanimous) agreement that commercial advertising is not itself as
central to the first amendment as are various other forms of communication .... ).
139. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772
n.24 ("[C]ommercial speech may be more durable than other kinds.").
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commentators disagree with the validity of the hardiness and nondeterability
justifications for providing commercial speech less protection than noncom-
mercial speech.'4
Although the Court has recognized that all speech is not of "equal First
Amendment importance," 1 41 statements which qualify as business defama-
tion and product disparagement perform a societal function which is larger
than the business's "narrow" economic interest in product sales: they
communicate a business or product's defects. This is the kind of information
consumers need most. Allowing states to deter false speech through a lower
standard of protection for business defamation defendants would also deter
speech critical of products. Potential discoveries of product defects would
be discouraged.
Positing that it is of no intrinsic value to consumers, the Court's com-
mercial speech doctrine denies first amendment protection to all false and
misleading speech. 142 Placing restrictions on criticism of products, businesses,
and business figures because of its falsity inevitably would deter some true
speech, however. The Court has held that even some false speech
is tolerated only to insure that would-be commentators on events of
public or general interest are not "deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true
because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to do so."' 4 3
Government regulation of false speech through lower recovery requirements
for plaintiffs would lead to inefficient allocation of resources;"44 consumers
would benefit most from a free flow of commercial information. 4 Such
140. See Schmidt & Bums, Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CN. L. REv. 1273, 1292 (1988). The authors note that noncom-
mercial speech is often motivated by the profit incentive as well. Less protection for commercial
speech will not provide more protection for consumers. "A more careful analysis of the profit
motive leads to the conclusion that the profit motive guarantees that a certain quantum of
speech will occur but leads to no conclusion about the quality of information conveyed by
that speech." Id. at 1293 (emphasis added).
141. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 758.
142. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
143. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 365 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279); see also Harte-
Hanks, 491 U.S. 657. "Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as
enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of
'breathing space' so that protected speech is not discouraged." Id. at 686 (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), quoted in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342).
144. "[E]ven untrue remarks may have positive effects upon the quality of our re-examination
process." Grove, 404 U.S. at 903 (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); accord
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. "Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable
contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error."' Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting J.S. MuLL, ON
LIBERTY 15 (1947)).
145. Contra Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff ": Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CQr. L. REv. 1205 (1988). According to Lowenstein, a completely free flow of
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an environment would encourage investigation of products and producers
and would limit a speaker's fear of liability from announcing possible
product defects.
Business defamation and product disparagement need not double as
consumer protection mechanisms. The marketplace should be the ultimate
arbiter of truth of commercial information.'"
"[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market
11147
Knowledgeable consumers can use their experience to determine the truth
of speech about businesses and products. 4 8 For example, in recent years
manufacturers have sought to capitalize on widespread consumer concern
for the environment by labeling goods environmentally safe. Wary of
exaggerated labeling, consumers are now "cynical" of the claims. 49 "[T]he
commercial information is not desirable because it would force people to receive unwanted
product messages. Id. at 1244. He would describe this Note's "argument as anti-paternalistic,
"stem[ming] from a view that informed self-determination is either the highest good or a
prerequisite to attaining the highest good." See id. Lowenstein criticizes the libertarian view
that consumers are best protected by an unrestrained, unregulated flow of commercial infor-
mation. Id. at 1244-45.
146. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. "The First Amendment, said Judge Learned
Hand, 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."' Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). "The primary purpose for protecting speech is not to
attain a universal truth but to protect each citizen'S quest for personal development and
attainment of his own truths." Burnett, Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech:
Consumers Confront the First Amendment, 5 Comm/ENrT 637, 657 (1983).
147. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
148. See May, supra note 124, at 65 ("I do not say that all food industry advertising is
informative, but I do insist that the American consumer has sense enough to distinguish the
promotional chaff from the informational wheat."); cf. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological
Tort of Defamation, 74 CAL. L. REv. 677, 681 (1986) (Under the marketplace theory of free
speech, society "may best be served if the citizens do not rely on the truth of defamatory
statements appearing in print, but rather consider these statements skeptically." (emphasis in
original)).
149. Marketing Greenery[.] Friendly to Whom?, supra note 121, at 83. "As shoppers learn
more about environmental issues, they are becoming cleverer at spotting companies making
bogus claims of greenery. A survey of 1,400 British shoppers ... indicates that 56% of those
surveyed are now suspicious of claims that products are environmentally friendly." Id.; see
also Forbes, Clutter Kills: The Junk Bonding of America, ADWEEK'S MLAETNG WEEK, June
18, 1990, at 24 ("The public is increasingly cynical about everything it sees, hears and reads.");
Wary Consumers Want More Health Ad Info, Advertising Age, Dec. 4, 1989, at 12, col. 1("Consumers say they want more health messages in food product ads, but they're looking at
those messages with a skeptical eye.").
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public in the market place has all the power in its hands. That it somehow
needs greater protection, I seriously doubt."' -1"
III. APPLYING HEIGHTENED DISPARAGEMENT LIABILITY STANDARDS
TO ALL CRITICISM OF PRODUCTS, BUSINESSES, AND Busmss FIGURES
Given the Supreme Court's view that an issue of narrow business concern
does not merit first amendment protection under defamation law, the
recovery requirements of product disparagement provide a level of protection
for speech which is higher than that of defamation law. 151 Disparagement's
stringent damages and fault requirements create an atmosphere of certainty
supportive of speech critical of products, businesses, and business figures.
Disparagement standards should replace the traditional defamation standards
for all criticism of businesses and business figures, and such speech should
receive the actual malice protection of New York Times.
This Part considers the issues relevant to the plaintiff's and the defendant's
status and the subject matter of the criticism which will arise with the
application of the actual malice standard to business disparagements. First,
the status of a business figure plaintiff within its company should not affect
the application of the heightened standard. Section A considers and dismisses
differing standards based on the business figure plaintiff's level. Second,
Section B considers the defendant's status as competitor-noncompetitor or
as media-nonmedia and concludes that those factors should also be irrelevant
to the application of full first amendment protection. Finally, Section C
considers the subject matter of the criticism and concludes that it should
not affect the application of full first amendment protection.
A. The Role of the Business Plaintiff
Whether a business plaintiff interacts with the public-either as a cor-
poration or a business figure-should have no effect on the level of first
amendment protection provided to a business disparagement defendant's
speech. In business disparagement actions, where "economic interests" are
at issue, "[t]he existence and strength of the plaintiff's economic interests
and of the defendant's first amendment interests do not depend upon the
public or private character of the plaintiff."' 152 Under the analysis of this
150. Cone, Advertising and the Market Place, in FREEDOM oP INFORMATION IN THE MARKET
PLACE, supra note 124, at 113.
151. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
152. Langvardt, supra note 31, at 960. Langvardt would maintain the distinction between
defamation law and disparagement. He states, however, that "the rules concerning how one
acquires public-figure status are not well-suited to business-related injurious falsehood cases."
Id. at 961. Instead, for product disparagement he advocates a focus both on the public interest
in the plaintiff's product and on the defendant's status. Id. at 962-63. For a discussion of the
merits of affording constitutional protection based on the subject matter of the business
criticism, see infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text; for a discussion of adjusting protection
according to the type of defendant, see infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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Note, a business figure plaintiff is a plaintiff employed by a business entity
that sells goods or services to the public. The public would include other
business figures because relations between business figures affect consumer
products and affect consumer investment decisions regarding the company
or industry. For example, speech in a corporate credit report is important
for the functioning of the economy.
A case-by-case analysis for determining the level of protection for the
disparaging speech based on the business figure plaintiff's level of influence
over products, services offered to the public, or transactions affecting the
public would not eliminate the uncertainty currently pervading business
defamation and disparagement in their current forms and would not promote
the free flow of information about products, businesses, and business
figures. A public interest-focused approach to analyzing the plaintiff's role
"would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations."' 53 The
public significance of speech about a business figure does not depend upon
the person's power within a business. Low-level employees can have sub-
stantial influence over different aspects of corporate policies and thus over
the consumer. The need for information about operations on the lowest
level is of no less value than the need for information about a chief
executive officer's activities.
To recover for damaging statements concerning the performance of their
duties or concerning a characteristic which has a direct hearing on their
fitness for the job, all business plaintiffs should prove: (1) that the statement
was false; (2) that the statement was published and was made with knowledge
of or reckless disregard for the truth; (3) that the defendant intended to
cause pecuniary harm or either recognized or should have recognized that
the statement would do so; and (4) that the pecuniary loss is directly
traceable to the defendant's statement. 54 When the injury follows from a
statement made about a plaintiff's operations or job performance, recovery
should be limited to special damages as defined in product disparagement
law. The kinds of injuries a business figure might prove and recover would
include lost employment, a lost wage increase, a lost promotion, or failed
business negotiations. Beyond the basic elements, business disparagements
153. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
154. These elements follow the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 623A,
liability requirements for injurious falsehood.
Any speech relevant to the plaintiff's job which contributes to decision making and allocation
of consumer resources must meet these requirements for recovery. Thus, a fact about a business
person's private life which has no relation to job performance would not receive heightened
protection.
A business figure criticized about an aspect of her life which bears no relation to her duties
could recover pecuniary loss from the damage to her nonbusiness life if she proves that the
defendant intended to cause harm or reasonably should have recognized that her speech would
cause harm to the plaintiff's nonbusiness life.
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should survive the plaintiff's death because the actions compensate for
economic loss."' Also, injunctive relief should not be available for business
disparagements because a free and robust discussion of products, businesses,
and business figures is so important in a consumer's daily life.
All business entities, whether huge multinational corporations or small
closely held corporations, must meet the disparagement requirements to
recover damages for speech which lowers them in the business community
and causes them pecuniary loss. As a corporation's size and geographic
scope increase, so will the number of potential critics of its operations. This
greater risk of disparagement is justified given the invisibly pervasive influ-
ence of large corporations.
156
When a product is disparaged that is closely identified with a high-level
official of a corporation, the officer's recovery should be combined with
that of the corporation, and it should be limited to harm to business-not
personal-reputation. Since a president or other high-level official has great
influence over corporate policy, speech about the officer's conduct is es-
pecially important to consumers and investors. The value of speech critical
of the corporation's products and business practices outweighs the indivi-
dual's interest in business reputation. A statement about an aspect of the
officer's nonbusiness life may be actionable under the requirements for
personal defamation if the statement does not involve something of impor-
tance in the free flow of commercial information-that is, if it does not
bear on the official's duties or on corporate policy which directly or
indirectly influences consumer spending or investing or other public affairs
such as the environment.
A more difficult situation arises when a product which is disparaged
carries the endorsement of a famous person and the celebrity has no
relationship with the endorsed company beyond licensing her name. A
similar situation involves a celebrity famous for her accomplishments in an
unrelated field who creates a consumer product and is closely associated
with it. The strong association with a famous person as creator or endorser
does not alter the public interest in the flow of product information. The
endorser should not recover for personal defamation when the product is
disparaged; by imposing such stiff recovery requirements, the endorser is
155. For a comparison of the defamation and disparagement policies on survival, see supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
156. Whether it involves price formulation, investment decisions, or interaction with the
environment, big business plays a significant role in a consumer's life. "[I]t seems that criticism
of the activities of a managerial class whose decisions may be closely interwined [sic] with
national policy should be given greater protection than common law standards traditionally
provide." Note, supra note 108, at 1507. "Large corporations, in particular, have considerable
involvement in American life, and public discussion of their activities should be subject to few
limitations." Stevens, Private Enterprise and Public Reputation: Defamation and the Corporate
Plaintiff, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 281, 286 (1974).
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encouraged to assume a high level of responsibility to ensure that the
products are safe and effective.
B. The Role of the Defendant
To ensure the free flow of a variety of information about products,
businesses, and business figures, the disparagement defendant's status should
be irrelevant to the business disparagement analysis. Some commentators
have argued that competitors should not receive actual malice protection in
disparagement suits. 5 7 Speech critical of a competitor's product is more
likely to be self-serving than speech by a noncompetitor. Some competitor
criticism may be useful for consumers, however.' 8 A case-by-case analysis
determining protection based on the defendant's status would create uncer-
tainty which might chill some true speech. "Competitor" is a term of
potentially limitless bounds. Many companies make products which compete
on one level or another; negative statements about one brand of an item
might cause a consumer to buy a wholly different item. Many items could
thus be classified as competitors of each other. In addition to a broad array
of competing items, this standard could create countless competitors within
each manufacturer. Speech by stockholders, employees, and former officers
of the competitor would be left vulnerable and subject to the chill of
potential liability.
Subjecting competitor-defendants to a lower fault standard for dispar-
agement liability would chill some valuable speech and diminish the effect
of competition between firms. Direct criticism by competitors inspires com-
panies to improve their product to avoid future criticism. Such criticism
would be of interest to consumers as well; providing all defendants actual
malice protection would diversify the flow of commercial information.
Similarly, the application of disparagement standards of liability for
statements critical of products, businesses, or business figures should not
157. Langvardt, supra note 31, at 968-69. "[T]his factor takes into account the influences
of the policies underlying unfair competition law .... The concern with promoting good faith
in the marketplace is strong enough to justify treating competitor defendant cases and
noncompetitor defendant cases differently." Id. at 968 (footnote omitted). The distinction also
reflects the commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 968-69.
Justice Garibaldi, concurring in Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., declined to
decide whether heightened first amendment protection would also apply to a suit against a
competitor. 104 N.J. 125, 162 n.4, 516 A.2d 220, 239 n.4 (1986). Another court held that the
first amendment does not require actual malice in a suit over an advertising war because the
ads merely proposed commercial transactions. United States Healthcare v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d Cir. 1990).
158. In fact, the Federal Trade Commission spawned the boom in comparative advertising
in 1971 when it urged the major television networks to accept such ads for broadcast. Kent,
Comparative Advertising, in LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS OF THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY
1989, at 115 (Practiding Law Institute 1989).
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turn on the media or nonmedia status of the speaker. Although at least six
members of the Court in Greenmoss agreed that constitutional protection
of defamation should not depend on whether the defendant is a member
of the media,'5 9 the Court on two recent occasions has expressly left the
issue open.160 Several cases applying the actual malice standard to product
disparagement have alluded to the value of consumer reporting and product
investigation.' 6' One commentator who favors the competitor-noncompetitor
distinction would provide nonmedia noncompetitors such as consumers full
protection.'6 Nonmedia criticism is just as valuable for consumer decision
making as media criticism. "'mhe inherent worth of... speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." ' 163
C. The Subject Matter of the Communication
Some commentators advocate an analysis focused on subject matter for
determining which statements should receive actual malice protection in
disparagement law.'" A case-by-case analysis would again create uncertainty,
159. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (plurality)
(White, J., concurring).
Wisely, in my view, Justice Powell does not rest his application of a different
rule here on a distinction drawn between media and nonmedia defendants. On
that issue, I agree with Justice Brennan [dissenting] that the First Amendment
gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others
exercising their freedom of speech. None of our cases affords such a distinction;
to the contrary, the Court has rejected it at every turn.
Id.
160. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 n.6 (1990); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986).
161. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
"Consumer reporting enables citizens to make better informed purchasing decisions. Regardless
whether particular statements made by consumer reporters are precisely accurate, it is necessary
to insulate them from the vicissitudes of ordinary civil litigation in order to foster ... First
Amendment goals .... ." Id.
162. See Langvardt, supra note 31, at 971.
163. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
164. In Dairy Stores, the court advocated a subject-matter test in holding the corporate
plaintiff to be a public figure because of the strong public interest in bottled water, the target
of the disparagement. 104 N.J. at 144-46, 516 A.2d at 230-31. "[M]atters of public interest
include such essentials of life as food and water. Widespread effects of a product are yet
another indicator that statements about the product are in the public interest .... [A]nother.
criterion is substantial government regulation of business activities and products." Id. at 144-
45, 516 A.2d at 230 (citations omitted).
See also Langvardt, supra note 31, at 963-69. Langvardt offers seven considerations to guide
courts in determining whether the speech is of private or public concern:
1. Whether the statement involves an allegation of criminal behavior....
2. Whether the statement pertains to an essential of life. [Such as] food [or]
water ....
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however, and might chill criticism about very narrow but very important
business issues. To ensure the full flow of information about products,
businesses, and business figures, the subject matter of the statement must
be irrelevant to the analysis. Arguably, most statements concerning busi-
nesses or products affect the public in some respect; to attempt to draw a
public interest line requires the judge to perform the ad hoc classifying the
Court sought to avoid in Gertz. 6 The free flow of information which is
valuable only to a small segment of the community would have a positive
effect on the economy and thus on consumers; 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is es-
sential to the welfare of the public."' 66
CONCLUSION
Removing all defamation actions involving businesses and business figures
from defamation and merging them with product disparagement would
maintain the distinction between personal reputation and economic interest
while realigning business defamation to represent the economic interests of
plaintiffs. The reorganization would remove the uncertainty surrounding the
area of overlap between business defamation and product disparagement.
Affording all business disparagement defendants the actual malice standard
would create a predictability which would encourage uninhibited criticism
of products, businesses, and business figures. Protection of criticism would
promote the free flow of commercial information and more efficient resource
allocation.
In the market place, more information for the consumer can mean
more-not less-freedom for private enterprise. For if we presume a
rational consumer as the keystone of our economy, as I believe we must,
3. Whether the statement pertains to a matter of public safety or public
health....
4. The extent and frequency of the public's use of the product or service referred
to in the statement....
5. Whether the product, other property, or service referred to in the statement
is heavily regulated by the government....
6. Whether the statement is part of a report about a government proceeding....
7. The extent of circulation of the statement....
Id. at 966-67 (emphasis omitted).
165. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346; supra note 58. But see Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 762. When
the communication was deemed to involve a narrow business interest and was not published
widely, the Court combined the public interest and plaintiff analyses to hold that the actual
malice standard for presumed and punitive damages was unnecessary to protect speech. "There
is simply no credible argument that this type of credit reporting requires special protection to
ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' Id. at 762
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
166. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 398 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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then whatever gives the consumer better grounds for more rational
choice contributes to a greater responsiveness and greater success in the
overall economy. For this reason, government and business must co-
operate closely and carry on a continuing dialogue to widen the channel
of consumer information."6
167. Peterson, Government Responsibility and Consumer Rights, in FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TON IN THE MARKET PLACE, supra note 124, at 59.

